FOD-Detection.com

China built the market this industry spent twenty years failing to build

Everything this site has documented about the commercial failure of FOD detection is a story about persuasion. An airport must be convinced to spend capital on a system whose benefit accrues largely to somebody else. Two decades of that argument produced two American installations.

China did not have the argument. It wrote the equipment into its regulatory and certification framework.

The primary documents — the Civil Aviation Administration of China’s technical standard AC-137-CA-2024-01, issued on 3 June 2024, its 2022 FOD management measures (AP-140-CA-2022-05), the revised Transport Airport Operational Safety Management Regulations (CCAR-140), and China’s working paper A42-WP/598 to the ICAO 42nd Assembly in September 2025 — set out the regime in full. FOD detection equipment is brought inside CAAC’s mandatory certification system for specialized airport equipment; uncertified systems are barred from airport premises, and airports with non-conforming equipment already installed must rectify it or suspend its use; certified equipment must detect at least 95 per cent of a ten-item real-object FOD test set within a 30 m × 30 m area and average no more than one false alarm a day across a 90-day test; and an airport whose certified system has operated effectively for a year is permitted to reduce its daily intermediate manual runway inspections. Three domestic systems — two edge-light and one tower-mounted — have passed qualification testing and been commissioned at Ezhou, Daxing and Hangzhou.

Three features of that are worth separating out, because each of them is something this industry has asked for and never got.

The first is an operational return that closes the airport’s business case, backed by a state deployment roadmap. The FAA’s AC 150/5210-24A tells an airport how to run a FOD programme while insisting that automated detection only supplements personnel and cannot reduce scheduled manual runway checks, and AC 150/5220-24 sets performance specifications for equipment an airport has no operational incentive to buy. Under AP-140-CA-2022-05 (Article 16) and CCAR-140 (Article 47), a year of verified automated operation lets an airport cut its intermediate manual runway sweeps — giving back runway slot capacity and inspection time that belong to the airport itself — alongside a CAAC Second Research Institute roadmap targeting every 40-million- and 10-million-passenger hub.

The second is a numeric performance floor. In AC-137-CA-2024-01 (Section 4.2 and Appendix B), 100 per cent detection of standard calibration pieces (three 43 mm golf balls and a 31 × 38 mm metal cylinder) and at least 95 per cent detection of ten real-world FOD items — spalled concrete, a runway light fitting, an adjustable wrench, a socket, tyre rubber, a twisted metal strip, a fuel cap, a lug nut, a hydraulic hose and PVC pipe — is a probability of detection, stated as a minimum requirement, in a regulatory document. This site has spent fifteen years pointing out that probability of detection is the quantity that governs risk and that no vendor publishes it. A regulator that specifies it forces the number into existence, because equipment must be tested against it.

The third is enforcement with teeth. Because AC-137-CA-2024-01 sits under China’s specialized airport equipment regulations (CCAR-137CA), uncertified hardware cannot enter an airfield, and — after an incident in which aircraft wake turbulence blew an edge-light detector onto a runway strip — the standard enforces wind-tunnel breakaway moments (withstanding 1,762 N·m, shearing before 2,847 N·m) and a 17,000 N tether cable. Rectify or stop using it is a sanction that falls on the airport, which means the airport has a reason to care whether the equipment actually meets the standard rather than merely being installed.

Against that backdrop, Xsight’s Beijing Capital and Daxing wins in 2019 stop looking like two good sales and start looking like the leading edge of a national procurement, most of it going to domestic suppliers — including CAAC’s own Second Research Institute, which equipped Daxing’s two western runways — and almost none of it reported in English.

The primary texts also clear up a persistent piece of secondary reporting: although a December 2023 revision draft of CCAR-140 floated differentiated equipage rules for fixed FOD detectors by airport size, the final November 2025 regulation dropped a blanket Category 4D+ installation mandate. China did not need one. Centralised greenfield capital, a regulatory credit against manual runway inspections, and compulsory qualification testing under AC-137-CA-2024-01 were enough.

The uncomfortable conclusion is that the barrier was never technical and never economic. It was that no civil aviation authority in the West was willing to require — or even reward — the thing its own performance standards had been describing since 2009.