Ryanair blames FOD for FR1879. The NTSB says it has determined nothing.
Correction, 15 August 2026. The NTSB preliminary report, released on 13 August, contradicts three things stated below. This piece said North Macedonia’s authority was leading the investigation; in fact the engine failed near Polykastro, about four and a half nautical miles inside Greece, and Greece’s HARSIA delegated the investigation in full to the NTSB on 16 July. It also described the failure as uncontained; the NTSB found no radial uncontainment through the engine cases, the fragments having left through the inlet cowl. And it gives the altitude at the time of the failure as about 16,000ft, not the roughly 15,000ft stated below. The inference drawn below from a 39-day ground stop at Kaunas is superseded by the maintenance record in the report. One clarification rather than a correction: the 16.8 years quoted below is the aircraft’s age at the time of that Kaunas stop, not at the accident. The original text is left unaltered. The follow-up sets out what the report actually found.
On 10 July, Ryanair flight FR1879 — a Malta Air Boeing 737-800 — left Thessaloniki for Memmingen and suffered an uncontained failure of its right CFM56-7B about six minutes after take-off, climbing through roughly 15,000ft. Debris struck the fuselage and destroyed a cabin window. A passenger was partly pulled through the opening in the decompression and was recovered by the people sitting around him. The aircraft returned to Thessaloniki.
Ten days later, Michael O’Leary offered a cause:
Initial indication would suggest it looks like a foreign object damage to the engine on takeoff at Thessaloniki.
He added that he could not say so definitively. On 22 July, NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy wrote to Ryanair to say that nobody investigating the accident had reached that conclusion:
The NTSB has not made any such determination, and our investigators have not yet ruled out age or servicing issues as contributing to this event.
She went further, and accused the chief executive of breaching the international convention governing accident investigations:
Mr. O’Leary’s public statements violate Annex 13 as they provide an opinion and analysis of the accident and suggest potential areas of interest in the ongoing investigation.
What is actually established is narrow. The aircraft was 9H-QEU, a Malta-registered Boeing 737-8AS a little over eighteen years old. North Macedonia’s investigation authority is leading, as the state in whose airspace the engine let go, with Malta, Greece, Boeing, the FAA, CFM International and the NTSB participating; the NTSB holds engine components and is examining the fan blades in the laboratory. A preliminary report is expected within weeks, and a final one will take considerably longer.
On the servicing question the NTSB has pointedly left open, one data point is already public. Cirium’s ground-event data has 9H-QEU stationary at Kaunas for 39 days across December 2024 and January 2025. Kaunas is where Kaunas Aircraft Maintenance Services sits — Ryanair’s own heavy-maintenance base in Lithuania, and the contracted provider for this airframe — and at 16.8 years old the aircraft was at the age where a scheduled heavy check falls due. A 39-day stop is consistent with one. That is an inference from a ground record and nothing more: it establishes when the aircraft was last opened up, not what was found, what was done, or what was missed.
This site has no view on what broke, and neither, on the record, does anyone with the hardware in front of them. But the argument is worth watching here, because of what the phrase is being asked to do.
“Foreign object damage” moves a cause off the engine and onto the airfield. It is the one explanation available to an operator that implicates nobody in its own maintenance organisation, and it is unfalsifiable early on, when the debris that supposedly caused it has long since been swept, blown or ingested. That is precisely why investigators dislike hearing it from a podium three weeks before the metallurgy comes back.
The precedent that will be worrying them is Southwest 1380 in 2018: the same engine family, a fan blade that failed in fatigue, and a passenger fatality at a shattered window. Southwest 3472 in 2016 was the same failure mode without the same outcome. Two uncontained CFM56 failures traced to metal in the blade, not metal on the runway.
If it does turn out to be FOD, the question this site cares about becomes the only question: what was on the runway at Thessaloniki that morning, and was anything watching it? Runway debris that nobody detects is not an act of God, it is a gap between inspections, and the systems built to close that gap have existed for two decades. If it turns out not to be FOD, the industry has just watched the term used as a shield in the most public engine failure of the year.
The fracture surface of a fan blade will say which it was. Everything before that is positioning.
Sources (Paddle Your Own Kanoo, Simple Flying; ground events from Cirium)