The FAA finally runs the numbers on FOD detection systems
The FAA has published a cost-benefit analysis of foreign object debris detection systems — report TC22-47, by Hilburn and Pesmen. It is the document this field has needed since the first system was switched on, and it is built on operational detection data rather than vendor claims.
The data sources are the two American installations. Seattle-Tacoma’s automated detections were logged over 48 months, January 2016 to December 2019. Boston Logan’s earlier data gives 155 detections in seventeen months, an average of 9.1 per month. Logan’s installation — FODetect, one runway, 2013 — is put at a total of about $1.71 million.
The analysis is blunt about why adoption stalled:
most existing automated detection systems rely on radar-based technologies, however, those methods have not been widely adopted due to their high cost
Set the two figures side by side and the shape of this industry’s commercial problem is visible in a single line. $1.71 million buys one runway. Nine detections a month. That is roughly one object found every three days, and the overwhelming majority of those objects would have caused no damage to anything.
The benefit is not in the average object. It is in the rare one that would have gone into an engine or a tyre, and the entire economic case therefore rests on a low-probability, high-consequence tail that a four-year detection log cannot resolve. Nine per month tells you the sensor is working. It does not tell you how many engine changes it prevented, and no airport in the world has run the controlled experiment that would.
This is exactly the gap the risk calculator was built to bridge, and readers of this site will recognise the structure of the argument: what matters is not how quickly you find an object but what fraction of objects you find at all, because the quantity that carries the risk is FOD minutes — how much debris is on the runway, multiplied by how long it stays there. A detection count is the visible half of that product. The half that matters is the objects that were there and were not detected, and by construction nobody logs those.
Two decades in, an FAA report has put real numbers from real runways into the public record. It deserves to be read by everyone selling into this market, and by everyone being sold to.
Sources (FAA AirportTech, Report TC22-47)