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FAA and EASA propose CFM56-7B fan-blade inspections after FR1879

Two months after the NTSB preliminary report on Ryanair flight FR1879, both European and US regulators have moved on the engine at the centre of it.

On 26 October, EASA issued Proposed Airworthiness Directive PAD 26-130, with public consultation running until 23 November. A day later, on 27 October, the FAA published a matching Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Docket FAA-2026-11817), covering roughly 3,450 US-registered engines and open for comment until 27 November.

Both proposals require a one-time detailed visual inspection of every fan blade on installed CFM56-7B engines, following CFM Service Bulletin 72-1119, which the manufacturer issued on 8 September. Installed engines must be checked within 400 flight cycles or 90 days of the final directive taking effect, whichever comes first; uninstalled engines must pass before further flight. Any blade showing unserviceable damage — cracks, tears, tip curls or local leading-edge distortions — must be replaced before the aircraft flies again, and operators must report unserviceable findings to CFM within 30 days.

For readers who followed the July dispute and the August metallurgy, the shape of the regulatory response is telling. Neither agency is treating FR1879 as a runway debris event. As the NTSB preliminary report established, Blade No. 10 fractured through a 16mm fatigue region in its dovetail root despite having passed ultrasonic root inspections under SB 72-1033 in November 2025 and May 2026.

At the same time, the visual criteria in SB 72-1119 — leading-edge distortions, tears and tip curls — are the classic signatures of foreign object impact, whether from bird strikes or hard debris. The NTSB found bird remains inside FR1879’s right engine and noted four reported bird strikes over the preceding year, without yet establishing whether any of them initiated the root crack. Looking across the fleet for leading-edge damage that may have gone unreported or unassessed is the obvious interim precaution while the laboratory work continues.

That closes the regulatory loop for now. An accident first described to the press as runway FOD at Thessaloniki has produced an engine-inspection directive across the 737 Next Generation fleet — and not a single change to airfield surface guidance.

Sources (Federal Register, EASA, AeroCorner)