FOD-Detection.com

The end of iFerret: Stratech wound up in 2018, delisted in 2020

The Stratech Group was removed from the Singapore Exchange official list on 23 October 2020. That was the paperwork. The substance had happened two years earlier: in September 2018 a Singapore court ordered the company wound up and appointed liquidators from BDO. Singapore’s company register still records Stratech Systems Limited — the entity that built iFerret — as in compulsory liquidation.

So one of the four systems this site has covered since 2008 no longer has a vendor. No successor company, no acquirer of the product line, and no continuing marketing appears in any public record we can find.

What makes it worth writing down is how little the order book had to do with it. In the eighteen months before the winding-up order, iFerret was arguably the most commercially successful FOD detection system in the world:

An automated FOD detection tender at Hong Kong International, won with Dah Chong Hong – Dragonair Airport GSE Service, worth around HK$280 million across design, supply, installation and sixty months of maintenance, with an option for twenty-four more. An upgrade contract for the original installation at Changi. A Miami International contract running an initial five years with options out to fourteen. A first deployment on a military airfield.

Marquee airports, long maintenance tails, a defence foothold. And it still went under.

There is a lesson in that for anyone selling into this market, and it is not a comfortable one. FOD detection is a capital purchase made by a handful of airports a year, after evaluation cycles measured in years, against a safety case the buyer finds hard to quantify. A supplier can win the names everybody in the industry recognises and still not convert them into a business that survives the gaps between them. That is a structural problem with the market, not a verdict on the technology — iFerret passed the FAA performance assessment and ran for years at Changi.

The sharper lesson is for airports. A detection system is not a purchase, it is a twenty-year dependency: spares, algorithm updates, sensor replacement, integration with whatever the tower moves to next. When the supplier stops existing, the equipment on the airfield does not, and neither does the maintenance obligation. It simply stops having anyone behind it.

Which leaves the question this site cannot answer from public sources: what actually happened to the installations at Changi, Hong Kong, Dubai and Miami after 2018 — kept running under local support, quietly replaced, or switched off? If you know, get in touch. It is the most useful unwritten chapter in this industry’s history.

Sources (Singapore company register, SGX announcements via SGinvestors)